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Affirmative Confusion: A Proposed
Paradigm Shift in Higher Education
Disciplinary Proceedings
Kendal Poirier
11 U. MASS L. REV. 412

ABSTRACT
This Note examines the codification of affirmative consent statutes in New York and
California as well as the language of Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972,
with the ultimate goal of demonstrating that the two statutory constructions cannot
co-exist without jeopardizing accused students’ due process rights. During the course
of a college or university disciplinary proceeding in an affirmative consent
jurisdiction, the potential exists for a burden shift onto the accused student to
affirmatively prove consent was obtained. Such a shift directly conflicts with Title
IX mandates for prompt and equitable treatment. This Note proposes that in order to
mitigate any confusion created by the aforementioned conflict between affirmative
consent statutes and Title IX, a policy shift in college and university disciplinary
proceedings is necessary. Rather than require an accused student to face a panel of
peers and administrators in a hearing forum designed to decide the student’s
responsibility, this Note proposes an investigatory model as a more appropriate
format for adjudicating sexual assault cases on college campuses. The investigatory
model allows colleges and universities to conduct comprehensive interviews and
investigations in a less contentious, less formal setting, allowing schools to gather
and contest necessary facts to make an informed decision on responsibility and
sanctions, while more effectively honoring accused students’ due process rights.
AUTHOR NOTE
Kendal Poirier earned her B.A. in 2012 from Saint Michael’s College and expects to
receive her J.D. from the University of Massachusetts School of Law in 2017. The
author would like to first and foremost thank Holly Galvin for her never-ending love
and listening ear, not just during the arduous note-writing process, but from the very
beginning of this law school journey. The author also owes almost everything to her
parents Mark and Clare, who have offered every kind of support and an endless
supply of encouragement and prepared meals. Many thanks to Professor Margaret
Drew for being a guiding light from the first total thesis revision to the final product,
and to Mary Beckwith, who not only provided essential resources but also an
opportunity for the author to gain essential experience in this field while developing
a true passion. Finally, the author wishes to thank her beloved SVU co-workers, who

412

2016

Affirmative Confusion

413

are more like family. To all those who have cheered and encouraged along the way,
thank you.

414

UMass Law Review

v. 11 | 412

PREFACE ....................................................................................................... 415
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 415
PART I: BACKGROUND ................................................................................. 418
A. Affirmative Consent ........................................................................... 418
B. Title IX ................................................................................................ 420
PART II: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT STATUTES AND
TITLE IX CREATES A THREAT TO DUE PROCESS ................................ 423
A. Affirmative Consent Imposes Inequitable Presumptions and Standards
........................................................................................................ 423
B. While Title IX requires equitable treatment ....................................... 427
C. The Threat to Due Process Created by This Conflict ......................... 428
PART III: TRENDS IN SEXUAL ASSAULT ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES AND
DISCIPLINE........................................................................................... 429
A. A Statistical Illustration of the Problem ............................................. 429
PART IV: MOVING FROM HEARINGS TO INVESTIGATIONS TO MITIGATE
POTENTIAL CONFLICT AND PROTECT DUE PROCESS RIGHTS ............. 431
A. The Investigatory Model Formula ...................................................... 431
B. Good Policy: How the Investigatory Model Preserves Due Process
Rights .............................................................................................. 434
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 436

2016

Affirmative Confusion

415

PREFACE
The purpose of this Note is to meaningfully discuss the conflict
between affirmative consent statutes and the requirements mandated
by Title IX for institutions of higher education adjudicating sexual
assault cases between students, while focusing on the threats to
accused students’ due process rights this conflict creates. The author
wishes to preface this Note with the assertion that this Note, while
focusing predominantly on the effect affirmative consent has on the
rights of the accused student, in no way invalidates the serious
problem of sexual assault on college campuses. Sexual assault remains
a complex and sensitive issue and the author does not aim to minimize
the suffering of those students who have been victimized, nor does the
author suggest that victims’ rights are any less important than those of
accused students. The author asks, however, that the reader understand
that the scope of this Note is focused on the rights of accused students
and that the reader keep an open mind when considering the argument
that accused students’ rights are an essential part of the equation when
dealing with sexual assault on college campuses.
INTRODUCTION

T

he year is 2014. President Obama stands in the East Room of the
White House and announces the “It’s On Us” campaign, a
nationwide initiative to raise awareness and encourage young people
to become more involved in preventing sexual assault on college
campuses.1 Ten days later, California becomes the first state in the
nation to sign into law a bill colloquially titled “Yes Means Yes,”
requiring public colleges and universities to implement a sexual
assault policy where affirmative consent must be obtained throughout
an entire sexual encounter.2 President Obama’s initiative and
California’s new law come at a time when the national spotlight shines
1

2

Michael D. Shear and Elena Schneider, Obama Unveils Push for Young People
to Do More Against Campus Assaults, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2014, 6:34 PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/20/us/politics/obama-campaign-collegesexual-assaults.html [https://perma.cc/SNT6-EEBY].
Bill Chappell, California Enacts ‘Yes Means Yes’ Law, Defining Sexual
Consent, NPR.ORG (Sept. 29, 2014, 12:27 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2014/09/29/352482932/california-enacts-yes-means-yes-lawdefining-sexual-consent [https://perma.cc/D3AZ-GLPR].
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hot and bright on college campuses in the wake of several highly
publicized sexual assault cases.3 In the summer of 2015, New York
followed California’s lead by passing its own affirmative consent
statute, which extends not only to public colleges and universities, but
to private institutions as well.4 At the time of this writing, there are
fourteen states with proposed affirmative consent statutes moving
through their legislatures.5 Victims’ rights advocates champion these
new pieces of legislation.6 Meanwhile, lost in the shuffle of national
publicity and groundbreaking legislation is the accused student.
As affirmative consent statutes gain prevalence in college sexual
assault policies, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title
IX) has been increasingly invoked in holding college and university
administrations accountable with regard to sexual assault.7 Generally,
Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in education
programs or activities operated by recipients of federal financial
assistance.8 In 2011, the United States Department of Education’s
Office for Civil Rights (OCR) issued a “Dear Colleague Letter” (the
Letter) to address issues of sexual assault on college campuses.9 The
Letter established that sexual violence such as rape falls under the
Title IX definition of sexual harassment, which schools are required to
address.10 The OCR also outlined a series of steps in the Letter that
schools must take in order to fairly and equitably investigate and
adjudicate allegations of sexual assault on their campuses.11
3
4

5

6
7

8
9
10
11

Shear & Schneider, supra note 1.
Susanne Craig and Jesse McKinley, New York’s Lawmakers Agree on Campus
Sexual Assault Laws, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2015, 2:30 PM), http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/06/17/nyregion/new-yorks-lawmakers-agree-on-campussexual-assault-laws.html [https://perma.cc/S764-6XUQ].
See generally Affirmative Consent Laws (Yes Means Yes) State By State,
AFFIRMATIVECONSENT.COM (Nov. 15, 2015, 10:05 AM), http://affirmative
consent.com/affirmative-consent-laws-state-by-state/?hvid=3aRofN [https://
perma.cc/92WV-3SD3].
See Chappell, supra note 2.
Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
to Colleagues (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
letters/colleague-201104.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LYN-HLAH].
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
Ali, supra note 7.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 9.
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While Title IX is intended to promote equity and fairness when
addressing sexual assault allegations,12 the introduction of affirmative
consent statutes creates confusion and conflict in the university
disciplinary arena under these equitable standards. By requiring an
accused student to prove affirmative consent was obtained in order to
rebut a presumption that consent was not obtained, and thus a sexual
assault occurred, accused students’ due process rights are endangered
as schools attempt to comply simultaneously with both Title IX and
their state’s affirmative consent statute.
Tellingly, not even the representative who drafted California’s
affirmative consent legislation can concretely articulate how such
cases are to be adjudicated. When asked how an accused person is to
prove he or she received consent, California Representative Bonnie
Lowenthal, co-author of the state’s affirmative consent bill, responded
“your guess is as good as mine. I think it’s a legal issue. Like any legal
issue, that goes to the court.”13
The purpose of this Note is to examine and critique California and
New York’s affirmative consent statutes, as well as the language of
Title IX, with the ultimate goal of demonstrating that the two statutory
constructions cannot co-exist without seriously jeopardizing students’
due process rights. Part I of this Note will provide the necessary
background on the development and implementation of the
codification of affirmative consent into law, and review both the
history of Title IX as a civil rights statute and its evolution as an
instrument in responding to sexual assaults on college campuses.
Part II of this Note will examine the shifting burden of proof onto
the accused student to affirmatively prove that he or she obtained
affirmative consent as the nexus at which these two laws conflict.
While affirmative consent requires an accused student to make a
showing of proof to rebut an accusation,14 Title IX requires “prompt
and equitable” treatment of cases involving sexual assault.15 The
codification of affirmative consent as a statute creates a conflict with
12
13

14
15

20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2015).
Josh Dulaney, Students Question ‘Affirmative Consent’ Bill Designed to Combat
Sexual Assaults, SAN GABRIEL VALLEY TRIB. (June 8, 2014, 5:40 PM),
http://www.sgvtribune.com/government-and-politics/20140608/studentsquestion-affirmative-consent-bill-designed-to-combat-sexual-assaults [https://
perma.cc/CGP9-WYED].
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386 (2014).
Ali, supra note 7, at 8.
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Title IX, thereby increasing the risk of violations to students’ due
process rights.
Part III offers a brief statistical overview of the prevalence of
sexual assaults on college campuses in order to illustrate the nature of
the problem that college and university administrators face when
writing their student conduct policies. Part III will further serve to
illustrate the procedural due process landscape of a college or
university’s disciplinary proceeding, delineating how those due
process rights typically manifest themselves in disciplinary settings. In
these proceedings, the student typically faces a panel of peers and
administrators who will make a ruling on the student’s conduct and
sanction the student accordingly.
Finally, Part IV of this Note will suggest the best method for
mitigating the confusion created by the conflict between affirmative
consent statutes and Title IX, thus protecting accused students’ due
process rights. Part IV will argue for a policy shift from a hearing to an
investigatory model, allowing colleges and universities to conduct
disciplinary investigations and proceedings in a less contentious and
formal setting while still honoring the due process rights granted to
accused students.
PART I:

BACKGROUND

A. Affirmative Consent
In 2014, California became the first state in the nation to pass an
affirmative consent statute into law, a bill now known as the “Yes
Means Yes” statute. Upon its passage, lawmakers explained the intent
of the bill was to create safer learning environments for students and
set in place “universal” policies for adjudicating complaints of sexual
assault to ensure consistency and fairness.16 The California bill
requires all California state schools to adopt an affirmative consent
standard with regard to sexual assault, domestic violence, dating
violence and stalking in order to receive state funds for student
financial assistance.17 That standard is described as “affirmative,

16

17

Christina Rudolph, California Senate Bill 967 Does Not Make Everyone a
Rapist: Proposed Guidelines for Analyzing its Ambiguities, 36 U. LA VERNE L.
REV. 299, 300 (2015).
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386 (2014).
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conscious, and voluntary agreement” to engage in sexual activity.18 “It
is the responsibility of each person involved in the sexual activity to
ensure that he or she has the affirmative consent of the other or others
engaged in sexual activity.”19 However, the statute also instructs it will
not be considered a valid excuse that the accused student’s belief in
affirmative consent arose from the intoxication of the accused.20 On
the other hand, if the complainant is incapacitated due to the influence
of drugs or alcohol, consent cannot be given.21 The statute goes on to
state that “lack of protest or resistance does not mean consent, nor
does silence mean consent.”22 According to California’s statute,
“affirmative consent must be ongoing throughout the sexual encounter
and can be revoked at any time.”23
New York’s statute outlines a similar standard, defining consent as
a knowing, voluntary and mutual decision among all participants to
engage in sexual activity.24 Consent can be given by words or actions,
provided those words or actions create clear permission regarding the
participants’ willingness to engage in the sexual activity.25 Silence or
lack of resistance does not meet the standard for consent.26 Further,
consent is required regardless of whether the initiating party is under
the influence of drugs and/or alcohol.27
One major difference between the New York and California laws
is that New York’s law also extends to private institutions.28 Thus,
both California and New York have enacted sweeping legislation
requiring all state institutions of higher education (in New York,
private institutions as well) to write affirmative consent into their
sexual assault policies or risk losing state funding.29
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6441 (McKinney 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386 (2014).
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One concrete illustration of an affirmative consent statute can be
found in the State University of New York (SUNY) system, which has
implemented drastic changes to their sexual assault policies to
conform to the statutory mandates required by affirmative consent as
well as create a uniform policy statewide.30 A Title IX administrator
with heavy involvement in re-writing the sexual assault policies
indicates that while the opportunity has not yet arisen to compare data
from this year and the previous year,31 students have received
extensive education on the changing policies and certain SUNY
schools have seen an increase in sexual assault reports.32 This same
Title IX administrator indicates that some schools struggle with the
application of the ambiguous language of the statute when both parties
are intoxicated, as the policy reads, “consent is required, regardless of
whether the person initiating the act is under the influence of drugs
and/or alcohol.”33 As universities such as the SUNY system continue
to grapple with the integration of the affirmative consent statutory
mandate into their student conduct policies, Title IX remains a fixture
in the adjudication of campus sexual assault disputes.
B. Title IX
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) far
precedes the enactment of affirmative consent statutes. Title IX
mandates “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”34 The United States
Department for Education (the Department) has issued a number of
documents providing guidance for institutions of higher learning to

30

31

32

33
34

Interview with Jane Doe, a Title IX Administrator, SUNY (Nov. 2, 2015)
(redacted transcript in the author’s possession available upon request) (All
school administrators have asked to remain anonymous; therefore, no
identifying information will be further provided in this article beyond what the
administrator has permitted).
Id. Data from these two years cannot be compared due to the novelty of the
statute and the resulting unavailability of data.
Id. The interviewee views this increased reporting as a positive change, as
students appear to be showing confidence in the new policy.
Id.
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
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ensure compliance with Title IX.35 In 2001, the Department issued a
guidance document reiterating the legal principal that sexual
harassment is a form of sexual discrimination prohibited by Title IX.36
Two landmark Supreme Court cases have further defined the Title IX
standard. The first, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,
held that “a school may be liable for monetary damages if a teacher
sexually harasses a student, the institution has actual knowledge of the
harassment, and is deliberately indifferent in responding to the
harassment.”37 The second, Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education, held that “a school may also be liable for monetary
damages if one student sexually harasses another student in the
school’s program and the conditions of Gebser are met.”38 However,
in its 2001 guidance document, the Department explicitly
distinguished between a school’s liability standards established by
those cases39 and the power of federal agencies to enforce
requirements that “effectuate Title IX’s nondiscrimination mandate.”40
In 2011, the Department followed its 2001 guidance document
with a “Dear Colleague Letter” intended to provide further guidance to
institutions of higher learning with Title IX compliance.41 The Letter
reiterated that sexual violence is a form of sexual harassment covered
under Title IX.42 Such forms of sexual violence include rape, sexual
assault, sexual battery, and sexual coercion.43 The Letter also indicated
that its purpose was to provide policy guidance to colleges and
universities so that these institutions will remain in compliance with

35

36

37
38
39
40

41
42
43

U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., Sex Discrimination: Policy Guidance, http://www2.
ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/frontpage/faq/rr/policyguidance/sex.html [https://
perma.cc/A457-LL3A] (last visited Oct. 19, 2015).
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Revised Sexual Harassment
Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or
Third Parties, TIT. IX (Jan. 2001), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
docs/shguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR2V-8JQW].
Id. at i-ii.
Id. at ii.
Id. at iii. Liability is limited to private actions for monetary damages.
Id. at ii (citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274,
292 (1998)).
See Dear Colleague, supra note 8.
Id. at 1-2.
Id.
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Title IX.44 The guidelines established by the Letter include the
assertion that Title IX investigations of sexual assault allegations must
be prompt, thorough and impartial.45 A school is also required to adopt
and publish grievance procedures providing for prompt and equitable
resolution of student and employee sex discrimination.46 The Letter
explains that an investigating body, when determining whether a
grievance procedure is prompt and equitable, will examine several
elements.47 These include: notice to students of the grievance
procedures, including where complaints may be filed; adequate,
reliable, and impartial investigation of complaints, including the
opportunity for both parties to present witnesses and other evidence;
and notice to parties of the outcome of the complaint.48 While this list
is instructive, the Letter asserts that it is not exhaustive, as grievance
procedures will vary in detail, specificity and components.49
Ultimately, the Letter seeks to impress upon schools that failure to
voluntarily comply with the guidelines set forth in the Letter may
result in the OCR50 initiating proceedings to withdraw federal funding
or referring the case to the U.S. Department of Justice for litigation.51
To offer additional guidance to schools on compliance procedures
with Title IX, the Department of Education issued a further guiding
document entitled Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual
Violence in 2014.52 While a disciplinary hearing is not required, the
designated Title IX coordinator remains responsible for examining the
disciplinary process in order to ensure compliance with Title IX’s
prompt and equitable requirements.53 Further, a school is required to
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

51
52

53

Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b)).
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
OCR is the enforcing agency of the Department of Education. See U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, About OCR, (Jan. 27, 2015) http://
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/aboutocr.html [https://perma.cc/CBX47P2Z].
Ali, supra note 7, at 16.
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Questions and Answers on Title
IX and Sexual Violence (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/
list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf [https://perma.cc/85WE-XKP9].
Id. at 25.
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give the complainant any rights that it gives the accused student during
the investigation and during any subsequent disciplinary proceeding.54
PART II:

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT
STATUTES AND TITLE IX CREATES A THREAT TO DUE
PROCESS

A. Affirmative Consent Imposes Inequitable Presumptions
and Standards
The statutory language of affirmative consent indicates “it is the
responsibility of each person involved in the sexual activity to ensure
that he or she has the affirmative consent of the other or others to
engage in the sexual activity.”55 However, conspicuously absent from
the statute is clear instruction on how an accused student should
proceed in proving that they in fact obtained affirmative consent.56
Even more troubling is the requirement that the accused “take
reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to the accused at the
time, to ascertain whether the complainant affirmatively consented.”57
In light of this ambiguous language, where silence nor lack of protest
or resistance does not mean consent,58 the burden arguably shifts to the
accused student to prove that he or she obtained consent and took
reasonable steps to obtain it throughout the sexual encounter.
Supporters of affirmative consent statutes argue that the responsibility
to ensure consent during sex is typical of behaviors exhibited during
consensual sexual encounters.59 However, when the question of
consent moves out of the bedroom and into a university disciplinary
proceeding, an accused student is arguably placed in a position to
prove that consent was obtained to rebut the presumption that consent
was not obtained.
In August of 2015, a trial court in Tennessee issued a ruling that
supports the argument that accused students are placed in an unfair
position during university disciplinary proceedings where affirmative
consent is the policy standard. In Mock v. University of Tennessee at
54
55
56
57
58
59

Id. at 26.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386 (a)(1) (2014).
See id.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386 (a)(2)(B) (2014).
Id.
See Rudolph, supra note 16, at 301.
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Chattanooga, the court held that the burden of proof was improperly
shifted and imposed an untenable standard upon the accused student to
disprove the accusation that he forcibly assaulted the complainant.60 In
Mock, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the accused student
(Mock) responsible for violating University Code of Conduct, Section
7 and ordered his dismissal from the University.61 Mock appealed the
decision to the University Chancellor, and a hearing was conducted in
which both sides, including the complainant, argued their respective
positions.62 The Chancellor upheld the ruling and ordered Mock’s
expulsion.63 Mock argued on appeal that the University Chancellor
shifted the burden of proof from the University and placed it upon
Mock, removing the requirement that the University prove a lack of
consent or inability to consent.64 Mock further argued that, as a
consequence of this burden shift, the University Chancellor found
Mock “violated the affirmative consent standard, essentially
formalizing a presumption of guilt and requiring Mr. Mock to prove
his innocence as an affirmative defense.”65

60

61

62
63
64
65

Mock v. Univ. of Tenn., No. 14-1687-II (Ch. Ct. of Davidson Cnty. Tenn., Aug.
4, 2015).
Id. at 2 (The administrative judge made the following findings of fact: Mock and
the complainant were known to each other before the alleged sexual assault,
which took place at a party. Both Mock and the complainant had been drinking.
The complainant alleges that at some point during the evening, she consumed
something that affected her memory, making her feel as if she were in “a fog.”
The complainant became sick from the alcohol and sometime later Mock
discovered her on the bathroom floor. They moved into an adjacent bedroom,
where they engaged in sexual intercourse. The ALJ made a preliminary
credibility determination of the complainant, whereby the complainant’s “own
testimony did not convince the hearing officer that she was intoxicated in order
to prove that Mock knew or should have known that her ability to consent was
seriously compromised.” However, following the university’s petition for
reconsideration, the ALJ made no changes to her findings of fact but reversed
her Initial Order by changing her conclusions and held that the university proved
by a preponderance of the evidence that the complainant never consented to
sexual activity). Author’s note: We can infer, based on the ALJ’s determinations
of the complainant’s testimony that the complainant testified at the initial
hearing.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
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The Chancery Court in the Mock case ultimately held that Mock’s
expulsion was “arbitrary and capricious” and a violation of Mock’s
due process rights when the University improperly interpreted the
Student Conduct Code and unfairly shifted the burden from the
charging party (the University), to the charged student (Mock).66 The
University took the position that it satisfied its burden of proof to show
that no affirmative consent was obtained by requiring the charged
student to affirmatively prove consent67 and the Chancery Court found
this shift to be “flawed and untenable if due process is to be afforded
the accused.”68 The Court further opined that, under the University’s
flawed standard, the accused student
Must come forward with proof of an affirmative verbal response
that is credibly in an environment in which there are seldom, if any,
witnesses to an activity which requires exposing each party’s most
private body parts. Absent the tape recording of a verbal consent or
other independent means to demonstrate that consent was given, the
ability of an accused to prove the complaining party’s consent strains
credulity and is illusory.69
The Mock case does not hold legal precedent in other states, nor
does Tennessee have an affirmative consent statute requiring all public
colleges and universities to develop an affirmative consent standard
for their sexual assault policies. The case is based on a unique set of
facts and law requiring a university in Tennessee to produce evidence
proving that a student violated the student code of conduct. One
commentator observes that such legalisms as “burden of proof” have
no place in campus disciplinary proceedings,70 and there is a concerted
danger in applying such terms to disciplinary hearings that closely
resemble legal proceedings, but are in fact civil proceedings with
much lower standards of evidence and proof than criminal legal
proceedings.71
66
67
68
69
70

71

Id. at 23.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Brett A. Sokolow & Daniel C. Swinton, Corey Mock v. The University of
Tennessee, Chattanooga, THE NCHERM GROUP, LLC (2015), http://www.
boysmeneducation.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NCHERMs-response-toCorey-Mock-v.-the-University-of-Tennessee-Chattanooga.pdf [https://perma.cc
/4793-GAXM].
Id.
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Nonetheless, the court’s reasoning on the issue of consent in the
Mock case compellingly illustrates the difficulties colleges and
universities may encounter when attempting to apply an affirmative
consent standard in a hearing forum that is akin to a legal proceeding,
but does not conform to the high burdens and strict rules of a
courtroom. Further, the Mock ruling is illustrative of the inequitable
environment that can exist when a school unfairly imposes a burden of
production on a student to prove they obtained affirmative consent,
lest the presumption that consent was not obtained stands and the
student is found responsible for a violation of sexual assault policy.72
72

A further possible cause for confusion that may arise as a result of the standard
created by the language of New York and California’s affirmative consent laws
can be found in the statutory clauses attempting to define when consent may or
may not be valid due to intoxication by either party. Both New York and
California statutes contain clauses that mandate it will not be a valid excuse for
an accused student to allege a lack of affirmative consent if the accused
student’s belief in the affirmative consent arose from the intoxication of the
accused. However, juxtaposed with this clause is a second clause that allows the
opposite for the complainant. Both statutes require that a complainant cannot
give consent if that person is incapacitated due to drugs or alcohol, and thus
cannot knowingly give consent. However, the statute fails to provide a standard
for which colleges and universities are to draw a line between intoxication and
incapacitation to the point where the complainant can no longer consent.
Therefore, while the accused student may not use his or her level of intoxication
as a factor to aid a disciplinary adjudicator in determining whether affirmative
consent was obtained or not, the complainant may use his or her level of
intoxication to argue that they were impaired to a degree that invalidates any
consent they may have given. Where the statute does not give guidance on the
line between mere intoxication and impairment however, the statutory language
arguably creates an inequitable standard for accused students, which would
appear to be in conflict with the mandates of Title IX. Courts have generally
held that voluntary intoxication is not a valid defense to general intent crimes.
See Chad J. Layton, No More Excuses: Closing the Door on the Voluntary
Intoxication Defense, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 535 (1997). However, some
jurisdictions allow a defendant to form a voluntary intoxication defense to
specific intent crimes, which may include sexual crimes. See Carter v. State, 408
N.E.2d 790 (1980) (holding that the charge of assault and battery with the intent
to satisfy sexual desires was a specific intent crime and thus the defense of
voluntary intoxication was available to the defendant); see also State v. Brown,
244 P.3d 267 (2011) (holding that the charge of aggravated indecent liberties
was a specific intent crime and thus the defense of voluntary intoxication was
available to the defendant). Given that criminal jurisprudence is undecided on
the use of intoxication as a defense, depending upon the jurisdiction, such
language arguably has no place in a statute governing university disciplinary
proceedings, where legal procedures hold no weight. Such language may only
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B. While Title IX requires equitable treatment
Juxtaposed against the affirmative consent statutes requiring
colleges and universities in New York and California to adopt
affirmative consent into their sexual assault policies is the federal
statutory mandate of Title IX, which prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sex in education programs or activities operated by recipients
of federal financial assistance.73 In order for a school to be compliant
with Title IX, the school’s sex discrimination grievance procedures
must be adequate, reliable, impartial and prompt.74 While an
investigation may include a hearing to determine whether the conduct
occurred, Title IX does not necessarily require a hearing.75 However,
the Dear Colleague Letter acknowledges that schools will generally
employ hearings in conjunction with their investigations to determine
whether sexual harassment or violence occurred.76 The Letter further
provides that in order to comport with equitable grievance procedure
requirements so as not to violate Title IX, schools are required to use a
preponderance of the evidence standard, and afford the parties equal
opportunity to present relevant witnesses and other evidence.77 The
Mock court’s decision arguably illustrates an inequity in the university
disciplinary system that conflicts with the equitable and impartial
requirements of Title IX.78 If an accused student is required to make a
showing that affirmative consent was in fact obtained, the disciplinary
process is no longer impartial and no longer equitable. As a result,
students’ due process rights are threatened in an environment where
colleges and universities are attempting to comply with both a
statutory mandate for affirmative consent and the gender-balancing
mandate of Title IX.
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increase confusion for schools attempting to enforce these policies and conform
to an affirmative consent statute while at the same time attempting to afford both
parties equal rights under Title IX mandates.
20 U.S.C. § 1681.
Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence, supra note 52, at 25.
Id.
Ali, supra note 7, at 10.
Id.
See Mock v. Univ. of Tenn., No. 14-1687-II 1, 20 (Ch. Ct. of Davidson Cnty.
Tenn., Aug. 4, 2015).
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C. The Threat to Due Process Created by This Conflict
Due process has long been a highly contested issue on public
college campuses. The Supreme Court has offered little guidance on
the procedural and substantive due process rights afforded students at
colleges and universities.79 Procedurally, the Supreme Court has held
that, at a minimum, a student has the right to effective notice and an
informal hearing permitting the student to give his version of events.80
This aligns with the basic language of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which requires that “deprivation of life, liberty or property by
adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case.”81 The Supreme Court further
acknowledges that longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder
of a school term, or permanently, may require more formal
procedures.82 However, the Court refrains from making a
determination on a basic formula for a hearing that students may be
entitled to under the due process clause.83 Beyond notice and the right
to some type of hearing, the Supreme Court made no further ruling on
any other rights to which a student may be entitled in a college
disciplinary hearing.84 Substantively, a student is afforded a due
process protection against arbitrary dismissals.85 Further, there must be
some reasonable and constitutional ground for expulsion or the courts
would have a duty to require reinstatement.86
The conflicts created by inconsistencies between affirmative
consent statutes and Title IX provisions create an environment where
colleges and universities increasingly run the risk of violating accused
students’ due process rights. The Mock court’s decision illustrates an
application of the substantive due process violation that can occur
when affirmative consent is utilized in a university disciplinary
proceeding. The court held that the improper burden shift onto the
79
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Lisa. L. Swem, Due Process Rights in Student Disciplinary Matters, 14 J.C. &
U.L. 359, 359-360 (1987).
See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572 (1975).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950).
Goss, 419 U.S. at 584.
Id. at 583.
See Swem, supra note 79, at 359-60.
Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 667 (11th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 667 (citing Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Ed., 294 F.2d 150 (1961)).
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accused student imposed “an untenable standard upon Mr. Mock to
prove that he forcible [sic] assaulted [the complainant]” rendering his
expulsion from the school arbitrary and capricious.87 In New York and
California, the affirmative consent standard is statutorily mandated and
failure to comply may result in cuts to funding for schools.88
Concurrently, Title IX requires an impartial and equitable
investigation into sexual assault allegations, and a failure to comply
with these standards will result in an investigation by the Office of
Civil Rights and potential cuts to federal funding.89 As schools attempt
to enforce affirmative consent standards to comply with the statutory
mandate, the threat of unequal burden shifts, like the one in Mock,
becomes increasingly plausible, and the disciplinary process becomes
inequitable. Schools will thus be in violation of Title IX mandates,
opening themselves up to scrutiny from the OCR and potential
litigation from accused students over sanctions as a result of unfair
processes.
PART III:

TRENDS IN SEXUAL ASSAULT ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES
AND DISCIPLINE

A. A Statistical Illustration of the Problem
Due to the novelty of affirmative consent statutes and the recent
close scrutiny of university sexual assault policies, data is fairly
limited on the statistical effect of affirmative consent statutes in New
York and California and whether they are impacting sexual assault
rates. Research consistently shows that one in five women report being
sexually assaulted on college campuses, with experts believing these
numbers to be an underestimation because sexual assault is vastly
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Mock v. Univ. of Tenn., No. 14-1687-II *23 (Ch. Ct. of Davidson Cnty. Tenn,
Aug. 4, 2015) (The court also cited the Chancellor’s failure to find that Ms.
Morris did consent, intertwined the definition in the Student Code of Conduct of
sexual assault and sexual misconduct, and made no distinction as to which acts
occurred. The court noted that the Chancellor ignored the ALJ’s credibility
determination on a crucial issue, which adversely impacted his findings and
conclusions).
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386 (2014); see generally N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6441
(McKinney 2015).
Ali, supra note 7 at 9, 16.
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underreported.90 Research also shows that at least 50 percent of
campus sexual assaults are associated with alcohol use.91 Of sexual
assaults involving alcohol use, between 81 percent and 97 percent
involved both parties consuming alcohol.92 Furthermore, less than onethird of students found responsible for sexual assault are expelled from
their colleges, while roughly 47 percent are suspended upon being
found responsible.93
A 2015 survey conducted by the risk-management group, United
Educators (UE), provides compelling analysis of trends regarding
perpetrators in sexual assault cases.94 The UE report indicates that
when sexual assaults are adjudicated, institutions impose their severest
sanctions.95 The study found that 43 percent of perpetrators deemed
responsible were expelled.96 Alternatively, 12 percent were suspended
for more than a year and 25 percent of those perpetrators found
responsible were suspended for less than a year.97
The numbers currently available regarding sexual assaults on
college campuses and the statistics referring to accused student
punishments are useful in order to understand the problem of sexual
assault on college campuses generally, but are not illustrative of trends
on college campuses now that affirmative consent has been codified
and applied as a statutory mandate. Both states with affirmative
90
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Christopher P. Krebs et al., The Campus Sexual Assault (CSA) Study, at xvii
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Women Say They Were Violated, THE WASHINGTON POST (June 12, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/local/2015/06/12/1-in-5-women-say-theywere-violated [https://perma.cc/U3GB-M3YV].
Antonia Abbey, Alcohol-Related Sexual Assault: A Common Problem Among
College Students, 14 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL, SUPPL. 119 (Mar. 2002).
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Tyler Kingkade, Fewer Than One-Third of Campus Sexual Assault Cases Result
in Expulsion, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.huffington
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See EduRisk by United Educators, CONFRONTING CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT:
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consent currently codified (New York and California) only
implemented their legislation in 2015, and thus substantive data is not
readily available on the mandates’ impact on college campuses.
However, the threats to accused students’ due process rights as a result
of the conflict between affirmative consent statutes and Title IX
remain a compelling issue as schools continue to address the pervasive
issue of sexual assault on their campuses.
PART IV:

MOVING FROM HEARINGS TO INVESTIGATIONS TO
MITIGATE POTENTIAL CONFLICT AND PROTECT DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS

A. The Investigatory Model Formula
One way that schools may seek to protect their students’ due
process rights is by shifting their disciplinary setting from a hearing to
an investigatory model. While current data is scarce on the number of
schools that utilize a disciplinary hearing within their adjudication
process, the Supreme Court has indicated in Goss v. Lopez that serious
cases may require a more formal hearing.98 A procedurally sound
disciplinary hearing gives a student the opportunity to be heard by a
disciplinary committee, and even a full-panel hearing in more serious
cases.99 The panel is screened to ensure impartiality and the student
has the opportunity to present witnesses and question them.100 Upon
the conclusion of a hearing, the panel will make a finding of
responsibility and recommend a sanction.101 The student then has the
opportunity to appeal the panel’s decision to a review board.102 While
the hearing model is popular among colleges and universities, it is
arguably inadequate for accused students to present their case in an
affirmative consent jurisdiction while preserving their due process
rights. The Supreme Court has firmly established that the only
procedural rights a student is entitled in the university disciplinary
proceeding are the right to notice of the charges against him or her and
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Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572 (1975).
See Furey v. Temple Univ., 884 F. Supp. 2d 223, 258-59 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
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the opportunity to be heard in some kind of hearing.103 With no further
procedural guarantees, the student faces the panel alone, in a highly
charged environment where he or she has been accused of sexual
assault, without the ability to directly question his or her accuser due
to Title IX mandates.104 In an affirmative consent jurisdiction, there is
an increased risk of unfair bias or burden shifting as schools attempt to
comply with the statutory mandate affirmative consent requires while
also comporting with the requirements of Title IX.
A more viable solution for protecting students’ due process rights
in an affirmative consent jurisdiction is to move towards an
investigatory model, which eliminates the hearing component of the
disciplinary process. Bridgewater State University in Massachusetts
has employed this policy for the past two years.105 In this model, once
a complaint has been filed, the University assigns “the matter to an
Administrative Investigator.”106 The Administrative Investigator
provides notification and a copy of the complaint to the accused
student.107 The accused student then has the opportunity to “submit a
written response” to the complaint.108 “If the respondent does not
respond, or otherwise fails to participate in the investigation, the
Administrative Investigator will complete the investigation on the
basis of [any] other information obtained.”109 The investigation must
include:
An analysis of the allegations and defenses presented using the
preponderance of the evidence standard; consideration of all relevant
103
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See Goss, 419 U.S. at 579; see also Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Ed., 294 F.2d
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See BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY, THE OFFICE OF COMMUNITY
STANDARDS, STUDENT CODE OF CONDUCT (2015-2016), https://www.
bridgew.edu/sites/default/files/Student-Code-of-Conduct-2015-4-30.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2Z9W-F2JY].
See BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY, THE OFFICE OF COMMUNITY
STANDARDS, INVESTIGATION AND RESOLUTION PROCEDURES (March 15,
2015), https://www.bridgew.edu/sites/default/files/Complaint%20Investigation
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documents, including written statements and other materials presented
by the parties; interviews of the parties and other individuals and/or
witnesses; and/or reviewing certain documents or materials in the
possession of either party that the Administrative Investigator has
deemed relevant.110
The Administrative Investigator may also consider police reports
generated by campus police or local law enforcement during the
investigation.111 “At the conclusion of the investigation, the
Administrative Investigator shall prepare an Investigation Report for
administrative review.”112 The Investigation Report provides a
comprehensive outline of the steps taken during the investigation,
including findings of fact.113 The Report also “states whether a policy
violation has occurred based on the preponderance of the evidence,
explains the rationale for the violation determination, and, if
applicable, recommends a sanction(s).”114
Following submission of the Investigative Report, a reviewing
body then conducts an administrative review.115 The purpose of the
administrative review is to determine whether the investigation was
sufficient, defined as “prompt, fair, impartial and thorough.”116 If the
reviewing body finds that the investigation does not meet these
requirements, the Administrative Investigator will gather additional
information.117 If the reviewing body determines that the investigation
was sufficient, the reviewing body then considers whether the
recommended sanction is appropriate.118 Once the administrative
review is complete, the accused student receives notification of the
reviewing body’s findings, including any sanctions imposed, and “a
written Notice of Outcome” is issued to the complainant.119
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B. Good Policy: How the Investigatory Model Preserves Due
Process Rights
The investigatory model, as outlined in Bridgewater State
University’s Student Code of Conduct is arguably a much sounder
method of dealing with sexual assault allegations on college campuses
than the disciplinary model. This is especially true in affirmative
consent jurisdictions where the potential inequity created between
affirmative consent and Title IX fosters an increased risk in due
process violations for accused students. One student conduct
administrator from a Massachusetts university recently proposed a
total revision of the school’s disciplinary proceedings, shifting from a
conduct hearing process to an investigatory process.120 The proposal
outlines several compelling reasons why the investigatory model is
superior to the conduct hearing model. Notably, the introductory
overview states, “[n]ew information is coming to us on a daily basis
from various governmental agencies and it is confusing and difficult to
incorporate sometimes contradictory principles and expectations into
our student conduct processes.”121 Further, the proposal emphasizes
the desire to move away from legalistic and adversarial processes (i.e.
a hearing), with the hopes of creating a process that focuses more on
restorative justice.122
The proposal goes on to illustrate positive policy and rationale
reasons for making the change to an investigatory model. These
include: limiting trauma for the victim by requiring him or her to tell
their story ONCE to a qualified investigator who is trained to ask
questions and make assessments based on a preponderance of the
evidence standard; the complainant, accused student and witnesses are
more likely to be open with an investigator in a one-on-one setting,
making the interaction much less adversarial than a hearing; and
questioning is likely to be more developmental with a trained
investigator, rather than a panel of board members with little
experience in dealing with sexual assault cases.123
120
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See Memorandum, Proposal: Revision of Student Conduct Policies and
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Based on the policy reasons outlined in the proposal, the
investigatory model offers a more relaxed setting that looks less like a
formal legal proceeding. The complainant and the accused student are
interviewed separately, eliminating contention that can undoubtedly
materialize in a formal hearing. There will likely be less risk of
imposing unfair presumptions or burdens of proof on the parties, as the
investigator is free to gather facts and assess them independently of
each other, culminating in a report that represents an objective
rendering of the circumstances of the case. Therefore, eliminating
hearings and instating an investigatory model may mitigate confusion
for affirmative consent schools and allow them to facilitate compliance
with Title IX requirements of impartial and equitable treatment of both
parties.
Colleges and universities may be reluctant to move away from the
conduct hearing model. The SUNY system continues to use the
conduct hearing model, even in the wake of the implementation of the
affirmative consent statute.124 SUNY administrators considered
moving from conduct hearings to an investigatory model, ultimately
deciding to continue holding hearings in order to ensure due process
for all involved students.125 However, it is important to emphasize that
the law requires no particular form of hearing.126 Further,
There is no general requirement that procedural due process in
student disciplinary cases provide for legal representations, a public
hearing, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, warnings
about privileges, self-incrimination, application of principles of former
or double jeopardy, compulsory production of witnesses, or any of the
remaining features of federal criminal jurisprudence.127
It is therefore important for colleges and universities to remember
that simply providing some kind of notice and hearing does not violate
a student’s due process rights.128 Proper notice and the opportunity to
be heard in an informal setting, such as a meeting with an investigator
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under the investigatory model is sufficient to meet due process
standards, according to the Supreme Court.129
CONCLUSION
The pervasive problem of sexual assault on college campuses has
resulted in nationwide media attention and a call to action from
legislators, administrators and even the President of the United States.
Affirmative consent statutes like those codified into law in New York
and California are making their way through numerous state
legislatures. However, affirmative consent statutes must co-exist with
Title IX mandates seeking to eliminate discrimination on college
campuses by promoting prompt, impartial and equitable response to
sex discrimination, including sexual assault. Due to ambiguous
affirmative consent statutes and the potential for misapplication of the
standard in a formal hearing setting, affirmative consent risks creating
an inequitable environment, which in turn creates a conflict with Title
IX’s requirements of equitable treatment. As a result, accused students
face potential violations to their due process rights in a formal conduct
hearing setting.
Schools can mitigate this risk by moving away from the conduct
hearing model and implementing an investigatory model in order to
clarify the application of affirmative consent while simultaneously
complying with Title IX requirements of equitable treatment for both
parties. The investigatory model maintains compliance with students’
due process rights and allows a trained investigator to make an
objective determination of the facts in a less contentious setting for all
parties involved. While the conduct hearing model has been the
traditional formula for institutions of higher learning for many years,
sexual assaults on college campuses and the legislature’s response in
the form of affirmative consent statutes present new challenges for
colleges and universities. By developing a more comprehensive
system using the investigatory model, schools will be able to protect
the rights of both the accused student and the complainant, ensuring
safer campuses and a united front against the scourge of sexual assault
in institutions of higher learning.
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